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Abstract 66 
Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT) is a psychotherapeutic approach based on the 67 
premise that when faced with adversity irrational beliefs determine unhealthy negative 68 
emotions and maladaptive behaviors, whereas rational beliefs lead to healthy and adaptive 69 
alternatives. The detrimental effects of irrational beliefs on psychological health are 70 
established, however less is known about the deleterious effects on human behavior and 71 
performance. In the present study we examined the effects of irrational and rational self-72 
statements on motor-skill performance (Experiment 1), performance effectiveness, and 73 
efficiency during a modified hazard perception task, and task persistence during a breath-74 
holding task (Experiment 2). Using a repeated measures counter balanced design, two cohorts 75 
of 35 undergraduate university students were recruited for Experiment 1 and 2, each 76 
participating in no self-statement, irrational, and rational self-statement conditions. Data 77 
indicated no differences in motor-skill and task performance, performance efficiency, task 78 
persistence, mental effort, and pre-performance anxiety between irrational and rational self-79 
statement conditions. In contrast to previous research the findings provide insight into a 80 
juxtaposition that irrational beliefs hinder psychological health, yet may help performance, 81 
highlighting important distinctions in factual and practical rationality that have been 82 
overlooked within the extant literature.  The findings have important practical implications 83 
for practitioners that may look to REBT to enhance the psychological health and performance 84 
for individuals who operate in high performance contexts. Further, the short and long-term 85 
effects of irrational and rational beliefs on performance and psychological health warrants 86 
greater investigation. 87 
 88 
Key words: REBT, irrational beliefs, rational beliefs, behavior, emotion.  89 
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Investigating the Effects of Irrational and Rational Self-Statements on Motor-Skill and 91 
Hazard Perception Performance 92 
Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT; Ellis, 1957) was created by Albert Ellis in 1955 93 
and is summarized by the ancient proverb “people are not disturbed by things, but by the view 94 
they take of them” (Epictetus 55-135). Central to REBT is the premise that irrational beliefs 95 
lead to psychological disturbance, whereas rational beliefs lead to enhanced psychological 96 
well-being (David, Szentagotai, Eva, & Macavei, 2005).  Using the ABCDE framework 97 
(Ellis, 1997), the process of REBT aims to identify the clients activating event (A) and elicit 98 
the relevant irrational beliefs (B) that lead to the corresponding unhealthy negative emotions 99 
and maladaptive behaviors (C). Irrational beliefs are then disputed (D) and replaced with 100 
rational alternatives (E), thus when encountering future adversities individuals will 101 
experience healthy negative emotions and adaptive behaviors that facilitate goal achievement 102 
(C; Dryden & Branch, 2008, Turner & Barker, 2014). Essentially, REBT allows the client to 103 
comprehend that in the face of failure, rejection, and poor treatment it is their beliefs that 104 
determine the functionality of their emotional and behavioral response (C), not the event (A). 105 
Irrational beliefs are characterized as extreme, rigid, illogical, and when encountering 106 
adversity (i.e., failure, rejection, or poor treatment) lead to unhealthy negative emotions (e.g., 107 
anxiety, depression) that propagate maladaptive behaviors (i.e., avoidance or escape-based 108 
behaviors) and hinders goal achievement (Dryden & Branch, 2008). Instead, rational beliefs 109 
are non-extreme, flexible, logical, and when encountering adversity are purported to lead to 110 
healthy negative emotions (e.g., concern, sadness) that facilitate adaptive behaviors (i.e., 111 
approach or assertive behaviors). When encountering adversity an individual’s beliefs are 112 
central in determining the functionality of emotional and behavioral responses towards goal 113 
achievement (Ellis & Dryden, 1997), consequently having clear implications for those 114 
operating in performance contexts. 115 
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Presently there exists an extensive body of research demonstrating the association 116 
between irrational beliefs and psychological distress. To illustrate, a recent meta-analysis of 117 
83 primary studies reported a moderate positive association between irrational beliefs and 118 
general distress (r = .36), depression (r = .33), anxiety (r = .41), anger (r = .25), and guilt (r = 119 
.29; Visla, Fluckiger, Holtforth, & David, 2016). Furthermore, the efficacy of REBT on 120 
psychological health has been supported with hundreds of studies and three previous meta-121 
analyses (e.g., Engels, Garnefski, & Diekstra, 1993). Originally REBT was put forth as a 122 
clinical model of therapy, and despite much research demonstrating the association between 123 
irrational beliefs and deleterious emotional and behavioral consequences less is known about 124 
the effects of rational beliefs and/or irrational beliefs on human behavior and performance 125 
(Turner & Barker, 2014). This is surprising as REBT is widely considered to offer a model of 126 
human functioning (David, Freeman, & Digiuseppe, 2010).  For those who operate in 127 
challenging and demanding contexts (e.g., business, elite sport, military) a rational 128 
philosophy (i.e., the endorsement of rational beliefs that are supported empirically, logically, 129 
and pragmatically) offers a pro-active approach that facilitates psychological health and goal 130 
achievement (Turner, 2016). Furthermore, the use of REBT has been reported across various 131 
performance settings such as, sport (e.g., Turner & Barker, 2014), education, and business 132 
(e.g., Criddle, 2007).  133 
Rational beliefs are proposed to reduce excessive concerns of failure and likely to lead 134 
to a healthy negative emotion (e.g., concern) and exert a positive influence on performance 135 
(Kombos, Fournet, & Estes, 1989). Irrational beliefs are proposed to lead to an exaggeration 136 
of the importance of performing well and being accepted by others, which may lead to 137 
unreasonable and self-imposed demands that are largely unattainable (Bonadies & Bass, 138 
1984). Furthermore, the anticipation that it would be “awful” (100% bad) when faced with 139 
failure, rejection, or poor treatment, may lead to an unhealthy negative emotion (e.g., anxiety) 140 
 
IRRATIONAL SELF-STATEMENTS AND PERFORMANCE    
 5 
and therefore hinder performance (Turner & Barker, 2014). Amongst the scant evidence base, 141 
Schill, Monroe, Evans, and Ramanaiah (1978) first evidenced that the adoption of irrational 142 
self-talk led to significantly more errors on a mirror-tracing task (i.e., reduced behavioral 143 
efficiency) compared to rational self-talk and control conditions. Additionally, the adoption of 144 
irrational self-talk has also been associated with reduced performance efficiency and 145 
increased anxiety during a mirror-tracing task, (e.g., Bonadies & Bass, 1984), as well as 146 
reduced performance during a series of trail making tasks (Kombos et al., 1989). 147 
Nevertheless, studies have reported only partial support for this hypothesis. For example, 148 
researchers have reported participants who adopted rational self-talk instead of irrational self-149 
talk reported decreased anxiety, whilst reporting no differences in persistence during an 150 
insolvable performance task (e.g., Rosin and Nelson, 1983). Evidence indicates the adoption 151 
of irrational self-talk may hinder task performance and reduce behavioral efficiency, (e.g., 152 
Bonadies, & Bass, 1984; Kombos et al.; Schill, Monroe, Evans, & Ramanaiah, 1978), 153 
however, findings remain inconclusive due to a lack of critical mass and methodological 154 
shortcomings within the extant studies.  155 
To explain,  previous studies have largely relied upon the use of imagined rather than 156 
real stressful events, whereby irrational self-statements are thought to only activate during 157 
real-life and meaninful situations (e.g., Ellis, 1994). Previous studies have also: failed to 158 
include a control group (e.g., Bonadies & Bass, 1984), used leading statements (e.g., 159 
participants were told these statements would help reduce errors in performance; Schill et al., 160 
1978), failed to discern the believability of the self-statements, and used performance tasks 161 
that lack in ecological validity (i.e., mirror-tracing task). Further, although researchers 162 
suggest that self-talk is better charatcerised in terms of directional interpretation (e.g., Hardy, 163 
2006), no studies have yet matched the perceived helpfulness of irrational and/or rational self-164 
talk statements with performance outcomes. On these grounds the investigation into the 165 
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effects of irrational and rational self-talk on performance warrants more rigourous 166 
examination. 167 
Not restricted to experimental settings the effects of irrational beliefs and/or rational 168 
beliefs on performance have been tested through the examination of REBT on important 169 
psychological outcomes (i.e., anxiety, perceived control) and competitive performance in elite 170 
sport. For example, researchers indicated that reductions in irrational beliefs were coupled 171 
with reductions in cognitive anxiety (e.g., Turner & Barker, 2013), enhanced facilitative 172 
interpretations of anxiety (e.g., Larner, Morris, & Marchant, 2007), perceived psychological 173 
and performance benefits (Turner, Slater, & Barker, 2015), as well as short and long-term 174 
improvements in self-efficacy, perception of control, and athletic performance (A.G. Wood, 175 
Barker, & Turner, in press). Collectively, the applied data indicate irrational beliefs may 176 
hinder whereas rational beliefs may be helpful for athletic performance. However, little 177 
research has included objective markers to assess the effects of REBT on performance 178 
(Turner, 2016), as well the samples (i.e., elite athletes) constrain the external validity of the 179 
study findings across other performance settings.  Ultimately, the effects of rational and 180 
irrational beliefs on important psychological outcomes, behaviors, and performance are yet to 181 
be established and require further enquiry (A. G. Wood et al., 2016). 182 
In sum, there is a paucity of objective and empirical research that examines the effects 183 
of irrational beliefs and/or rational beliefs on performance. Moving beyond previous research 184 
methods and shortcomings, in the current study we aimed to conduct a rigorous examination 185 
into the effects of irrational and rational beliefs on behavior using measures of competitive 186 
performance. We add to the extant literature by examining the effects of irrational and 187 
rational self-statements on cognitions, emotions, and performance. To illustrate, in 188 
Experiment 1 we used a laboratory-based competitive golf-putting task as measure of motor-189 
skill performance (e.g., Wulf & Su, 2007). In Experiment 2 we used a modified hazard 190 
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perception task as an objective measure of performance efficiency (visual search behavior) 191 
and performance effectiveness (hazard perception performance). In addition, a breath-holding 192 
task was used to measure task persistence.  193 
Experiment 1 194 
In Experiment 1 we examined the effects of irrational and rational self-statements on 195 
performance outcomes, pre-performance anxiety, concentration disruption, and the perceived 196 
helpfulness of self-statements. Previous research demonstrates that participants who adopt 197 
irrational self-statements record lower behavioral efficiency during a visual-spatial task 198 
compared to participants who adopt rational self-statements (e.g., Bonadies, & Bass, 1984; 199 
Kombos et al., 1989; Schill et al., 1978). Similarly, in Experiment 1 we used self-statements 200 
closely aligned with REBT theory (DiGiuseppe, Doyle, Dryden, & Backx, 2013) to promote 201 
irrational and rational performance approaches to a competitive golf-putting task (e.g., Wulf 202 
& Su, 2007) and assess performance. Addressing the limitations of past research (i.e., tasks 203 
lack in ecological validity) we used a motor-skill task as a measure of performance whilst 204 
controlling for participants total irrational belief scores. Furthermore, we incorporated: a real-205 
life motivated performance situation rather than imagined scenario using competitive task 206 
instructions (e.g., Turner, Jones, Sheffield, & Cross, 2012), controlled for participants current 207 
(baseline) task proficiency, and ascertained participants perception of the self-statements in 208 
terms of helpfulness and believability. Based on previous research we hypothesized that when 209 
participants used irrational self-statements they would report higher-levels of pre-210 
performance anxiety, higher performance concentration disruption, and achieve lower 211 
performance scores in the competitive golf-putting task compared to when they used rational 212 
self-statements. Finally, we hypothesized participants would perceive the rational self-213 
statements to be more helpful towards the performance task, but report no differences in 214 
believability between self-statement conditions. 215 
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Method 216 
Participants 217 
Previous research most akin to the present study (i.e., examined effects of IBs, similar 218 
research design, & measures; Visla et al., 2016; Wilson, Wood, & Vine, 2009) reported 219 
moderate to large effects, thus supporting the expectation for medium effects. An apriori 220 
power analysis using (G*Power 3) showed that based on a medium effect size (η2 = .06) and a 221 
power of .80 a minimum number of 28 participants were required for the present study.  222 
Thirty-five undergraduate students (26 = Male, 9 = Female) were purposively recruited at a 223 
UK university aged between 18 and 53 years (Mage = 20.92, SDage = 5.62). Institutional 224 
ethical approval and participant consent was obtained prior to all data collection, whilst a 225 
power analysis was considered as part of the peer review process. 226 
Measures 227 
Trait irrational beliefs. The Shortened General Attitudes and Beliefs Scale (SGABS; 228 
Lindner, Kirkby, Wertheim, & Birch, 1999) was used as a measure of total irrational beliefs . 229 
Consisting of 22-items, the total irrational belief subscale reported a good internal reliability 230 
score of α = .84. The rational belief subscale consisted of 4 items and reported an 231 
unacceptable internal reliability score of α = .38 and was omitted from the data analysis 232 
process. Participants reported on a 5-point Likert-scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 233 
5 (strongly agree) the extent they agreed with each statement.  234 
Pre-performance anxiety.  The State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 235 
1983) includes 20-items which assess pre-performance state- anxiety. Participants reported 236 
their answers on a 4-point Likert-scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much so). A 237 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient reported an excellent internal reliability score α = .93. 238 
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Concentration disruption. Items associated with concentration disruption subscale 239 
were taken from the Sport Anxiety Scale-2 (SAS-2; Smith, Smoll, Cumming, & Grossbard, 240 
2006) measuring concentration during the competitive performance task. Participants 241 
reported on a 4-point Likert-scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much so). The 242 
concentration disruption subscale consisted of four-items and reported an excellent reliability 243 
score of α = .93.  244 
 Golf putting performance. The competitive performance task consisted of 10 putts. 245 
The target consisted of a putting hole worth 10 points, surrounded by 4 concentric circles 246 
separated at 5 cm intervals. Each concentric circle from the centre hole were scored with 8, 6, 247 
4, and 2 points respectively. Zero points were scored if, the ball landed outside of the 248 
outermost concentric circle or participants exceeded the 10 seconds time limit allocated to 249 
each competitive putt. A maximum of 100 points and a minimum of 0 points were available 250 
for the 10 competitive putts for each experimental condition. 251 
Task engagement. To discern participant’s motivation towards the competitive 252 
performance task, engagement was measured using a single item on a 7-point Likert scale 253 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (completely).   254 
 Self-statement perception. Participants’ perceptions (i.e., the helpfulness, 255 
believability, and engagement) of the self-statements were determined using three items on a 256 
7-point Likert-scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 7 (completely). 257 
Procedure 258 
Participants attended the lab individually on three separate occasions, first completing 259 
a baseline condition (A; no self-statements), then completing irrational (B) and rational (C) 260 
self-statement conditions in a counterbalanced design (ABC/ACB; Foley, 2004; see Figure 1). 261 
Laboratory set-up. Prior to attending the lab a survey link using Qualtrics software 262 
(Copyright © 2015) was distributed via email to all participants’ to collect total irrational 263 
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belief scores. On arrival participants were briefed on the research protocol and the 264 
expectations of their involvement.  To control for learning effects participants were first 265 
familiarized to the golf-putting task during the baseline condition.  266 
Competitive task instructions. Competitive task instructions were first read to the 267 
participants to create a motivated performance situation (e.g., Turner et al., 2012). The 268 
instructions emphasized the task demands prior to the performance task and minimized 269 
possible reductions in task motivation and effort over successful trials (e.g., Wilson et al., 270 
2009). Specifically, the participants were informed that their scores would be compared and 271 
ranked on a publically available leader board, and the winner for each condition would be 272 
awarded a £25 cash prize (e.g., Barker, Jones, & Greenlees, 2010). The task instructions also 273 
emphasized the time-constraints, uncertainty, evaluation, and effort that would be required to 274 
complete the performance task.  275 
Self-statements. Following the task instructions during the baseline condition, 276 
participants were asked to self-report their pre-performance anxiety and motivation towards 277 
the upcoming golf-putting task. Instead for irrational and rational self-statement conditions, 278 
prior to completing the self-report measures participants were asked to engage with, and 279 
adopt a set of self-statements. Each set consisted of one self-statement for each of the four 280 
core beliefs central to REBT theory (Dryden & Branch, 2008). The extent to which self-281 
statements were understandable was examined in a pilot study (N = 8) with minor structural 282 
and content alterations being made. Self-statements were worded in reference to the content 283 
area of ‘achievement’ and the competitive golf-putting task (available on request from the 284 
first author). Specifically, irrational and rational beliefs each consist of four core beliefs that 285 
are dichotomously matched and are related to a single content area (e.g., control, comfort, 286 
achievement; DiGiuseppe et al., 2013). Irrational beliefs consist of the core beliefs of: 287 
demandingness (e.g., “I really would like to be successful, therefore I must”), low-frustration 288 
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tolerance (e.g., “If I am not successful it would be intolerable”), awfulizing (e.g., “if I was not 289 
successful it would awful”), and self/other/life-downing (e.g., not being successful would 290 
make me a complete failure”). Instead, rational beliefs consist of the four core beliefs of: 291 
preferences (e.g., “I would like to be successful, but that does not mean I have to”), anti-292 
awfulizing (e.g., “not being successful would be bad but certainly not terrible”), high-293 
frustration tolerance (e.g., although I would like to be successful, not being so would be 294 
tolerable”), and unconditional self-acceptance (e.g., not winning does not make me a 295 
complete failure, only that I have failed this time and this shows that I am a fallible human 296 
being”). To check understanding of the self-statements participants were asked to detail and 297 
summarize the content in their own words. Following this, participants then self-reported 298 
their pre-performance anxiety and motivation towards the upcoming golf-putting task.  299 
Golf-putting performance task. After completing the questionnaires participants 300 
were instructed when to begin and that the task would end when they had played all 10 golf 301 
putts. Immediately prior to the golf-putting task participants were reminded that their 302 
performance was being video recorded and was to be evaluated by an expert golfing coach, 303 
that they only had 10 seconds to play each putt, and that their score would be placed on leader 304 
board that was accessible to all participants. Between every two putts they were instructed to 305 
engage with the self-statements by using a cue card located next to the putting position.  306 
Data Analysis  307 
Prior to the main analyses data screening procedures were completed. To limit the 308 
effect of outlying values, self-report data with Z score values greater than ± 3 were 309 
winsorized and replaced with the smallest or highest untrimmed score (Keselman, Algina, 310 
Lix, Wilcox, & Deering, 2008). A Shapiro-Wilks test was conducted on all data sets to test 311 
for assumptions of normality. A one-way analysis of co-variance was completed to compare 312 
the effects of irrational and rational self-statements (condition - predictor variable) with 313 
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dependent variables while controlling for baseline scores (baseline covariate) and the effects 314 
of total irrational beliefs (covariate). Preliminary checks were conducted to ensure that there 315 
was no violation of assumptions of normality, linearity, homogeneity of variances, 316 
homogeneity of regression slopes, and reliable measurement of the covariate.  In the instance 317 
dependent variables were correlated a multivariate analysis of co-variance was performed 318 
(Mertler & Vannatta, 2002). Preliminary assumption testing was conducted to check for 319 
normality, linearity, univariate, and multivariate outliers, homogeneity of covariance 320 
matrices, multicollinearity, and no covariates were highly correlated with one another (r > 321 
.08). Effect size values (eta squared) were interpreted in line with guidelines presented by 322 
Cohen, (1988): 01 = small effect, .06 = moderate effect, .14 = large effect. 323 
Results 324 
Preliminary Analyses 325 
Manipulation checks. To test the participants understanding of the self-statements 326 
the content of the written summaries were subjectively assessed by the lead author in 327 
accordance to the four core beliefs central to REBT theory (Dryden & Branch, 2008). To test 328 
whether the participants’ irrational and rational beliefs during the golf-putting task was 329 
successfully manipulated, the participants adoption of irrational and rational self-statements 330 
were examined using a single ‘engagement’ item on the self-statement perception scale. 331 
Statistical analysis revealed that regardless of the condition participants were engaged with 332 
the self-statements (M = 4.44, SD =1.34), t(69) = 27.80, p < .001. In addition, statistical 333 
analysis revealed participants did not differentiate in engagement with the self-statements 334 
between irrational (M = 4.37, SD = 1.44), and rational (M = 4.51, SD = 1.25) self-statement 335 
conditions, F(1, 33) = .33, p = .57. 336 
Task engagement. The participant’s engagement towards the golf-putting 337 
performance task was assessed using a single item on a self-report scale. Statistical analysis 338 
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revealed that regardless of the condition participants were motivated towards the golf-putting 339 
performance (M = 5.30, SD = .89), t(104) = 61.16, p < .001. Further, participants did not 340 
differ in task engagement between baseline (M = 5.29 SD = .83), irrational (M = 5.23, SD = 341 
.88), and rational (M = 5.37, SD = .98) self-statement conditions, F(2, 33) = .35, p = .71.  342 
Main Analyses 343 
Three one-way analyses of covariance were used to investigate differences in golf-344 
putting performance, performance anxiety, and concentration disruption between irrational 345 
and rational self-statement conditions. After adjusting for baseline scores and trait irrational 346 
beliefs, analysis revealed no significant differences in putting performance F(1, 32) = 2.27, p 347 
= .14, Wilks’ Lambda =.93, η2 = .07, performance anxiety, F(1, 32) = .41, p = .53, Wilks’ 348 
Lambda =.99, η2 = .01, and concentration disruption, F(1, 32) = .13, p = .73, Wilks’ Lambda 349 
=.99, η2 = .01(see Table 1). 350 
A multivariate analysis of covariance was conducted to investigate whether 351 
participants differed in their perceived helpfulness and believability of irrational (ISS) and 352 
rational self-statements (RSS). After controlling for the effect of trait irrational beliefs 353 
analysis revealed no significant effects for perceived helpfulness (ISS - M = 3.66, SD = 2.26; 354 
RSS - M = 3.43, SD = 1.79) and believability (ISS - M = 4.46, SD = 1.88; RSS - M = 5.03, SD 355 
= 1.48), F(2, 32) = 1.15, p = .33, Wilks’ Lambda =.93, η2 = .07. 356 
Discussion 357 
Past literature has suggested that irrational beliefs should hinder performance, while 358 
rational beliefs should help performance, but research to date has not examined acute skilled 359 
performance as conducted in the current study. In sum, data evidenced no differences in 360 
motor skill performance, pre-performance anxiety, concentration disruption, perceived 361 
helpfulness, and believability of the statements between the irrational or rational self-362 
statement conditions. Data do not support the study hypotheses or previous research findings 363 
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(e.g., Bonadies, & Bass, 1984; Kombos et al., 1989; Turner & Barker, 2013), indicating that 364 
acute performance was not differentiated by irrational and rational approaches to a 365 
competitive task. Further, participants perceived no differences in the helpfulness of irrational 366 
and rational self-statements towards the competitive golf-putting task. Nevertheless, 367 
performance outcomes alone (e.g., task score) may not fully reflect the complexity of skilled 368 
performance. For example, previous research used visual spatial tasks (e.g., mirror tracing) as 369 
a measure of performance efficiency, indicating that irrational self-talk led to reductions in 370 
performance efficiency (e.g., Bonadies & Bass, 1984; Schill et al., 1978), but not necessarily 371 
competitive performance outcomes.  In contrast to previous research (e.g., Rosin & Nelson, 372 
1983), the results also show the adoption of irrational self-statements did not determine 373 
higher levels of pre-performance anxiety or concentration disruption compared to rational 374 
self-statements. This may be explained by first, contemporary REBT theory posits healthy 375 
(e.g., concern) and unhealthy negative emotions (e.g., anxiety) are distinguished by 376 
functionality rather than the intensity (Hyland & Boduszek, 2012). Hence, we may expect to 377 
observe changes in functionality via the assessment of participant’s perceived helpfulness of 378 
anxiety. Second, the measurement of anxiety via self-report may not accurately reflect pre-379 
performance emotional responses due to social desirability (e.g., Williams & Krane, 1992), 380 
thus more objective markers are warranted. Previous research has evidenced greater 381 
physiological arousal (measured via Galvanic Skin Response) when adopting irrational self-382 
statements compared to rational self-statements (e.g., Master & Gershman, 1983). Therefore, 383 
objective markers of physiological arousal may yield more accurate findings. Accordingly, a 384 
more refined and detailed investigation into the precise influence of irrational and rational 385 
self-statements across various psychophysiological outcomes and performance indicators 386 
(e.g., efficiency, task persistence, objective outcomes) is warranted. 387 
 388 
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Experiment 2 389 
In this experiment we examined the effects of irrational and rational self-statements 390 
on measures of performance efficiency and effectiveness, task persistence, and competitive 391 
task performance outcomes, extending Experiment 1, which measured task performance 392 
outcomes only. In Experiment 2 we measured visual gaze behavior (measuring performance 393 
efficiency and effectiveness) during a competitive Hazard Perception Task (HPT; phase one) 394 
and persistence during a Breath Holding Task (BHT; phase two). In line with Experiment 1, 395 
pre-performance anxiety and concentration disruption were measured. Further building on 396 
Experiment 1, heart rate and perceived helpfulness of anxiety were also measured to provide 397 
an objective measure of physiological arousal and a directional measure of pre-performance 398 
anxiety respectively. 399 
According to the processing efficiency theory (PET; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) 400 
emotions such as anxiety may take up available processing resources in the working memory, 401 
in turn hindering performance efficiency. However, decrements in efficiency may not be 402 
reflected in performance outcomes (e.g., task score), as performance can be maintained 403 
(Wilson, Smith, Chattington, Ford, & Marple-Horvat, 2006). Using a hazard perception task, 404 
previous research has evidenced a quicker ability to fixate on a hazard after its appearance 405 
underpins hazard perception performance (Crundall et al., 2012). In addition, researchers 406 
have also shown an increase in fixation duration to a detected hazard is also indicative of 407 
performance effectiveness and increased attentional capture (Garrison & Williams, 2013).  408 
Moving beyond Experiment 1, this was the first study to use markers of visual search 409 
behavior as an objective measure of performance efficiency and effectiveness, thus providing 410 
a rich dynamic source of psychological processes during the competitive hazard perception 411 
task (Richardson & Spivey, 2004).   412 
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Past laboratory research (e.g., Rosin & Nelson, 1983) indicated no differences in task 413 
persistence between irrational and rational self-statements. However, researchers suggest that 414 
irrational beliefs may be acutely motivational on the approach to an important competitive 415 
event, and therefore may lead to greater persistence (Turner, 2016). Further, REBT 416 
practitioners have indicated that irrational beliefs such as “I must succeed” may be considered 417 
motivational by performers (Turner & Barker, 2014). Therefore in Experiment 2, alongside 418 
measuring participants perceived mental effort, a Breath Holding Task (Hajek, Belcher, & 419 
Stapleton, 1987) was used as a raw measure of task persistence whilst tolerating discomfort 420 
(e.g., Sütterlin et al., 2013). 421 
Drawing on the aforementioned literature we propose a series of hypotheses for 422 
Experiment 2. First, participants using irrational self-statements would record reduced 423 
performance efficiency, in terms of decreases in both fixation durations to the detected hazard 424 
and ability to fixate on the hazard after its appearance (i.e., time elapsed between hazard 425 
appearance and first hazard fixation; Crundall et al., 2012). Second, participants would record 426 
worse performance outcomes (hazard perception score) when adopting irrational self-427 
statements compared to rational self-statements.  Finally, participants who adopted irrational 428 
self-statements would also record greater task persistence, greater mental effort, higher 429 
anxiety intensity, lower perceived helpfulness, and increased physiological arousal (i.e., 430 
increased heart rate) compared to when using rational self-statements.  431 
Method 432 
Participants  433 
As in Experiment 1, the effect sizes reported in research similar to the present study 434 
(e.g., Williams & Cumming, 2012; Wilson et al., 2006) reinforced the expectation for 435 
medium effects. Based upon an apriori power analysis, 35 undergraduates (26 = Male, 9 = 436 
Female) were purposively recruited at a UK university and were aged between 18 and 30 437 
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years (Mage = 21.09, SDage =2.92). All held a full UK driving license and had been driving 438 
for a minimum of 6-months. None of the participants had visual or hearing impairments that 439 
impeded their ability to complete the tasks. 440 
Measures 441 
As used in Experiment 1, measures of trait irrational beliefs were collected using the SGABS 442 
(α = .84). 443 
Pre-performance anxiety. To ascertain levels of pre-performance anxiety and reduce 444 
completion time the STAI was reduced from 20 to 10 items. These 10 items were selected 445 
based upon the best psychometric properties within the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI 446 
Form Y; Spielberger, 1983) as validated within the State Trait Personality Inventory (STPI; 447 
Spielberger & Reheiser, 2009). A Cronbach’s alpha coefficient reported excellent internal 448 
reliability (α = .90). Participants also reported on a 7-point Likert-scale ranging from -3 (Not 449 
at all helpful) to 3 (Extremely Helpful) the directional interpretation of their pre-performance 450 
anxiety in relation to the upcoming competitive task.  451 
Physiological arousal. Participants heart rate were measured using a MP45 Biopac 452 
(Biopac Systems Inc. 2016) to provide an objective and accurate assessment of physiological 453 
arousal on approach to both competitive performance tasks (HPT and BHT). A Biopac 454 
Analysis software (Biopac Systems Inc. 2016) ascertained changes in heart rate scores 455 
between baseline phase (after receiving the self-statements and before the pre-performance 456 
preparation phase) and pre-performance preparation phase (between starting pre-performance 457 
preparation and immediately prior to beginning the task).  458 
Hazard perception performance. A HPT provided an objective measure of task 459 
performance (i.e., response time), specifically measuring participants’ ability to quickly 460 
perceive and respond to a potentially dangerous driving situation (G. Wood, Hartley, Furley, 461 
& Wilson, 2016). Hazard perception scores were marked out of 20 and measured using 462 
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response times (milliseconds) between the onset of the hazard and when the participant 463 
indicated the presence of a hazard  (mouse click). Participants were provided with a window 464 
of 5000 milliseconds and in the instance a click was not registered 0 points were awarded. 465 
Scores from each clip were summed to produce a final performance score. Hazard perception 466 
performance was assessed using three hazard perception clips each containing one major 467 
developing hazard - lasting between 55 and 60 seconds. Each clip was: specific to driving, 468 
featured everyday road scenes, contained one developing major hazard, and was fully 469 
counterbalanced between conditions. 470 
Eye tracking and fixation analyses. Participants’ visual search behavior during the 471 
appearance of the major hazard provided an objective indicator of performance efficiency and 472 
effectiveness (Garrison & Williams, 2013). First, fixation duration to the detected hazard was 473 
measured as an indicator of attentional capture and a predictor of effective hazard perception 474 
performance (G. Wood et al., 2016). Specifically, fixation duration was calculated as a 475 
change score of mean fixation duration between the baseline phase (total clip length prior to 476 
onset of the major hazard) and during the presence of the major hazard. Mean scores were 477 
calculated across three hazard perception clips. In addition, the time taken to fixate on the 478 
major hazard after its appearance was measured as an indicator of performance efficiency and 479 
predictor of effective hazard perception performance (Crundall et al., 2012). Time taken to 480 
fixate on the hazard was calculated as a mean time elapsed between the appearance of the 481 
major hazard and time of first fixation towards the hazard location (milliseconds). A fixation 482 
was defined as a gaze that remained on a single location for longer than 100ms and the 483 
frequency of the gaze was calculated as the mean number of times a location was fixated on 484 
(milliseconds; Garrison & Williams, 2013). SR Research Ltd. Experiment Builder software 485 
(Copyright 2016) monitored patterns of visual gaze behavior via the Eye Link 1000 sampling 486 
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at a rate of 2000 Hz that recorded monocular gaze direction with an accuracy of 0.25 – 0.5 487 
degrees.   488 
Breath-holding task. The BHT (Hajek, Belcher, & Stapleton, 1987) provided a 489 
behavioral indicator of task persistence whilst tolerating discomfort (e.g., Sütterlin et al., 490 
2013). Breath holding performance scores were measured in seconds from when the 491 
participant initiated the first inhalation until the first exhalation. Participants’ compliance with 492 
the BHT was measured on a 9-point Likert-scale (a) to what degree they followed the 493 
instructions precisely, (b) to what degree they tried to hold their breath as much as possible, 494 
and (c) whether they could hold their breath for any longer (Sütterlin et al., 2013). 495 
Perceived mental effort. The Rating Scale Mental Effort (RSME; Zijlstra, 1993) 496 
provided a validated uni-dimensional measure of mental effort. After the completion of both 497 
HPT and BHT participants were required to indicate on a continuous vertical scale the 498 
amount of mental effort invested within the task. The scale consists of anchor points ranging 499 
from 0 (Absolutely no effort), 75 (moderately effortful) to 150 (Extreme effort).  500 
Manipulation checks and task engagement. As in Experiment 1, perceptions of self-501 
statements were collected in reference to both HPT and BHT. Furthermore, Participants’ 502 
motivation towards both competitive performance tasks was measured using a single item. In 503 
line with previous research increases in heart rate were also measured using MP45 Biopac 504 
(Biopac Systems Inc. 2016) to provide an objective indicator of participant’s engagement 505 
with the HPT (e.g., Turner et al., 2012). 506 
Procedure 507 
As in Experiment 1, measures of total irrational beliefs were collected prior to arrival. 508 
Participants then attended the lab individually on three separate occasions in a 509 
counterbalanced design (ABC/ACB; Foley, 2004). Experiment 2 spanned two phases with the 510 
study procedure (see Figure 1) repeated for both the HPT (phase one) and BHT (phase two) 511 
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in one testing session (see Figure 1).  Data collection was completed using a combination of 512 
on-screen instructions and verbal cues from the researcher (Lead author). Psychological data 513 
was collected using an external laptop positioned in close proximity to the participants seating 514 
position. Using the Biopac software participants were fitted with electrodes to continuously 515 
monitor participants’ heart rate(s) throughout the entirety of Experiment 2. 516 
Phase one. On arrival participants were calibrated to the eye tracker using a 9-point 517 
grid displayed on the computer screen. Once calibrated, participants were provided with on 518 
screen instructions and a familiarization hazard perception clip.  The provision of self-519 
statements or no self-statements followed the procedures used in Experiment 1. Participants, 520 
were asked to summarize the content of the self-statements in the their own words before self-521 
reporting the intensity and perceived of helpfulness of their pre-performance anxiety, as well 522 
as their motivation towards the upcoming task. Prior to the HPT participants were asked to 523 
take a few moments to re-familiarize and engage with the given set of self-statements, or to 524 
think (baseline) and prepare themselves for the upcoming performance (specific instructions 525 
available from the first author). Immediately prior to and between each of the three 526 
randomized hazard perception clips participants were re-calibrated using drift correct 527 
measures. On completion, participants remained connected to the MP45 Biopac to monitor 528 
heart rate(s) before proceeding to phase two. 529 
Phase two. As in phase one, participants were asked to read a new set of competitive 530 
instructions regarding the BHT and provided with verbal instructions on how to complete a 531 
BHT. Specifically, participants were asked to sit comfortably on a chair, to pinch their nose, 532 
and asked to hold their breath for as long as possible, even if they felt the urge to breathe 533 
again (Sütterlin et al., 2013). Once familiarized and practiced with this technique the 534 
participant was provided and asked to adopt self-statements that were tailored to their 535 
performance in the BHT. As used in phase one, participants then completed a series of self-536 
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report measures before taking a moment to re-familiarize and engage with the self-statements 537 
and prepare for the BHT. At the end, participants were asked to complete measures of 538 
perceived mental effort and compliance with the BHT. Additionally, in reference to both the 539 
hazard perception and breath-holding task participants self-reported their perceptions of the 540 
self-statements.  541 
Data Analysis 542 
The statistical analysis procedures followed those use in Experiment 1fgreen 543 
Results 544 
Preliminary Analyses 545 
Manipulations check. All 35 participants indicated successful understanding of the 546 
self-statements. In reference to both hazard perception and breath-holding tasks, statistical 547 
analysis revealed regardless of the condition participants were equally engaged with the self-548 
statements (M = 4.37, SD = 1.64), t(69) = 22.26, p < .001. Analysis also indicated 549 
engagement with the self-statements did not differ between irrational and rational self-550 
statement conditions after controlling for trait irrational beliefs, F(1, 33) = 2.84, p = .10. 551 
Task engagement. As in Experiment 1, statistical analysis was conducted to test 552 
participant’s motivation towards both hazard perception and breath-holding tasks using a 553 
single self-report item. Analysis of self-report data revealed regardless of the condition 554 
participants were engaged with both the HPT (M = 5.23, SD = .97), t(104) = 55.05, p < .001 555 
and BHT (M = 5.07, SD = 1.32), t(104) = 39.41, p < .001. Furthermore, analysis indicated 556 
engagement with the self-statements did not differentiate between baseline, irrational, and 557 
rational self-statement conditions in both HPT, F(2, 33) = .22, p = .81 and BHT, F(2, 33) = 558 
.415, p = .66. Statistical analysis also revealed regardless of the condition participants were 559 
engaged with the HPT, as indicated by mean increases in heart rate scores (M = 2.67, SD = 560 
4.91), t(104) = 5.58, p < .001.  In addition, participants did not differentiate in heart rate 561 
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increases between baseline (M = 3.06, SD = 5.69), irrational (M = 2.35, SD = 4.39), and 562 
rational self-statement conditions (M = 2.61, SD = 4.68), F(2, 33) = .20, p = .82. Statistical 563 
analysis showed regardless of the condition participants reported compliance with the BHT, 564 
as indicated by three items on a BHT compliance measure (M =6.28, SD = 1.46), t(104) = 565 
44.08, p < .001. Furthermore, analysis indicated participants did not differ in BHT 566 
compliance between baseline (M = 6.11, SD = 1.56), irrational (M = 6.35, SD = 1.56), and 567 
rational self-statement conditions (M = 6.39, SD = 1.29), F(2, 33) = .86, p = .68. 568 
Main Analyses 569 
The main analyses are presented in three sections. The effects of irrational and 570 
rational self-statements on outcomes measures are reported in reference to the modified HPT 571 
and BHT in the first two sections (see Table 1). The final section reports participant’s 572 
perceptions of helpfulness and believability of the self-statements between irrational and 573 
rational conditions. 574 
Hazard perception task. 575 
Hazard perception performance. To test the effects of irrational and rational self-576 
statements on hazard perception performance a one-way analysis of covariance was 577 
conducted. Statistical analysis reported no significant differences between irrational and 578 
rational self-statement conditions after controlling for trait irrational beliefs and baseline 579 
scores, F(1, 32) = .94, p = .18, η2  = .06. 580 
Visual gaze behavior. To examine the effects of irrational and rational self-statements 581 
on participant’s performance efficiency, after adjusting for baseline and trait irrational beliefs  582 
two one-way analyses of covariance were conducted. Analysis revealed no significant main 583 
effects between self-statement conditions in mean fixation duration during the presence of the 584 
major hazard, F(1, 32) = .58, p = .45, η2  = .02.  Further statistical analysis also revealed no 585 
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significant differences in time taken to first fixation of the major hazard, F(1, 32) = .59, p = 586 
.45, η2  = .02.  587 
Pre-performance anxiety. Two one-way analyses of covariance were used to 588 
investigate differences in the intensity and the directional interpretation of pre-performance 589 
anxiety between irrational and rational self-statement conditions prior to the HPT. After 590 
controlling for trait irrational beliefs and baseline scores analysis revealed no significant 591 
differences in intensity, F(1, 32) = .08, p = .78, Wilks’ Lambda =.99, η2 = .00, the directional 592 
interpretation of pre-performance anxiety, F(1, 32) = .62, p = .44, Wilks’ Lambda =.98, η2 = 593 
.02. 594 
Physiological arousal. To examine the effects of irrational and rational self-595 
statements on participant’s physiological arousal a one-way analysis of covariance was 596 
conducted.  No significant effects were found in heart rate between conditions after 597 
controlling for trait irrational beliefs and baseline scores, F(1, 32) = 1.82, p = .67, η2  = .01. 598 
Breath-holding task.  599 
Task persistence and perceived mental effort. Two one-way analyses of covariance 600 
were used to examine differences in task persistence and perceived mental effort between 601 
irrational and rational self-statement conditions during a BHT. After controlling for trait 602 
irrational beliefs  and baseline scores analysis revealed no significant differences in task 603 
persistence F(1, 32) = 1.63, p = .21, Wilks’ Lambda =.95, η2 = .05, and perceived mental 604 
effort F(1, 32) = 3,81, p = .06, Wilks’ Lambda =.89, η2 = .11, 605 
Pre-performance anxiety. Two one-way analyses of covariance were used to 606 
investigate differences in the intensity and the directional interpretation of their pre-607 
performance anxiety between irrational and rational self-statement conditions prior to the 608 
BHT. After adjusting for trait irrational beliefs and baseline scores analysis revealed no 609 
significant differences in intensity, F(1, 32) = .31, p = .58, Wilks’ Lambda =.99, η2 = .01, the 610 
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directional interpretation of pre-performance anxiety, F(1, 32) = .56, p = .46, Wilks’ Lambda 611 
=.98, η2 = .02. 612 
Physiological arousal.  To examine the effects of irrational and rational self-613 
statements on changes in physiological arousal, as measured by changes in heart rate a one-614 
way analysis of co-variance was conducted. After controlling for total irrational belief scores 615 
and baseline scores, analysis revealed no main effects between irrational and rational self-616 
statement conditions, F(1, 32) = 1.67, p = .21, η2  = .05. 617 
Self-statement perception. Statistical analysis was conducted to examine participants 618 
perceived helpfulness of the self-statements between irrational and rational conditions for 619 
both the hazard perception and breath-holding task. After controlling for total irrational belief 620 
scores, a one way analysis of co-variance reported no significant effect in perceived 621 
helpfulness for both HPT, F(1, 33) = 2.41, p =.13, η2  = .07, and the BHT, F(1, 33) = 1.86, p 622 
=.18, η2  = .05. The results indicate irrespective of the condition participants reported no 623 
difference in perceived helpfulness between the rational self-statements (RSS) and irrational 624 
self-statements (ISS) for both the HPT (RSS - M = 4.83, SD = 1.40; ISS - M = 3.46, SD = 625 
1.82) and BHT (RSS - M = 4.86, SD = 1.48; ISS - M = 3.77, SD = 1.94). In reference to both 626 
hazard perception and BHT a one-way analysis of covariance reported significant differences 627 
in the believability of self-statements between irrational (M = 3.74, SD = 1.82) and rational 628 
self-statements (M = 5.17, SD = 1.48) after controlling for trait irrational beliefs, F (1, 33) = 629 
1.66, p = .21, η2  = .05.  630 
Discussion 631 
Experiment 2 sought to extend the findings from Experiment 1 by assessing the 632 
effects of irrational and rational self-statements on objective measures of performance and 633 
performance efficiency during a competitive hazard perception task; as well task persistence 634 
during a breath-holding task. As in Experiment 1, data indicate no differences in competitive 635 
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performance, performance efficiency, task persistence, mental effort, and pre-performance 636 
anxiety (self-reported and heart rate) between irrational and rational self-statement conditions.  637 
 REBT theory indicates the endorsement of rational beliefs is unhelpful, whereas 638 
irrational beliefs hinder performance (Dryden & Branch, 2008). In Experiment 2 both fixation 639 
duration to detected hazard and time taken to fixate on the major hazard were assessed as 640 
objective and sensitive indicators of performance efficiency predictive of hazard perception 641 
performance (G. Wood et al., 2016). The present findings indicate no differences in 642 
performance effectiveness and efficiency between irrational and rational self-statement 643 
groups and accordingly support the results of Experiment 1, whilst contrasting with data from 644 
previous studies (e.g., Bonadies & Bass, 1984; Kombos et al., 1989; Schill et al. 1978). To 645 
further understand the effects of beliefs Turner and Barker (2014) suggested when 646 
encountering adversity (i.e., sporting competition) irrational beliefs may harbour motivational 647 
qualities. However, in-line with previous research (e.g., Rosin & Nelson, 1983) both task 648 
persistence and perceived mental effort were not differentiated by either an irrational and 649 
rational approach towards a competitive task. In contrast to previous studies the findings 650 
suggest irrational beliefs did not enhance self-reported pre-performance anxiety (e.g., Rosin 651 
& Nelson, 1983) or lead to higher levels of physiological arousal (e.g., Master & Gershman, 652 
1983) when approaching the competitive hazard perception or breath-holding task. 653 
Furthermore, an irrational or rational approach did not determine differences in the perceived 654 
helpfulness of the pre-performance anxiety.  Notably however, significant differences were 655 
recorded in the believability between the self-statement groups with participants reporting 656 
irrational self-statements to be less believable compared to rational alternatives. 657 
General Discussion 658 
The investigation into understanding human beliefs offers important implications for 659 
research and practice aiming to enhance human functioning across various performance 660 
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contexts. In the present study we aimed to examine the effects of irrational and rational self-661 
statements on acute performance, as well as important psychological outcomes previously 662 
associated with performance. Collectively, the findings disconfirmed the study hypotheses, 663 
challenging previous research that indicated irrational self-statements were associated with 664 
reduced task performance (e.g., Bonadies & Bass, 1984; Schill et al., 1978). In addition, the 665 
results challenge predictions of REBT theory that irrational beliefs hinder, whereas rational 666 
beliefs are helpful towards performance. There exists a plethora of research supporting the 667 
detrimental effects of irrational beliefs on psychological health (David et al., 2005; Visla et 668 
al., 2016) that have also been supported in the context of elite sport (e.g., emotional and 669 
physical exhaustion; Turner & Moore, 2015). Nonetheless, the results indicate that 670 
participants did not differ in their behavioral performance (i.e., golf-putting performance) and 671 
performance efficiency (i.e., eye gaze data) when adopting an irrational and rational approach 672 
towards a real-life competitive task. To explain, REBT theory merely posits irrational beliefs 673 
to be associated with maladaptive behaviors common in clinical settings (e.g., increased 674 
anger, self-harming, procrastination; Dryden & Branch, 2008). Further, previous research 675 
examining the effects of irrational self-statements on behavior is scant and fraught with 676 
methodological shortcomings and the precise short-term effects of irrational beliefs remained 677 
equivocal. Ultimately, evidence supporting the adverse effects of irrational beliefs on 678 
performance is meagre, thus, the notion that for some irrational beliefs may enhance 679 
performance is one that should be seriously considered.   680 
Contrary to previous research (e.g., Rosin & Nelson, 1983) no differences were 681 
reported in pre-performance anxiety, perceived helpfulness of pre-performance anxiety, and 682 
accordingly no differences were reported in concentration disruption. Acknowledging the 683 
limitations of self-report measures (Williams & Krane, 1992), and in line with previous 684 
research (e.g., Harris, Davies, & Dryden, 2006) objective measures of physiological arousal 685 
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were used in the present study.  Whilst increases in heart rate suggested participants were 686 
engaged with the competitive task, results suggest participants did not differ in physiological 687 
arousal when adopting irrational and rational self-statement conditions. 688 
Researchers proposed irrational beliefs may harbour motivational qualities (Turner & 689 
Barker, 2014), subsequently encouraging perseverance in the face of hedonic costs in an 690 
attempt to realize long-term ambitions, certainly an important component of adaptive 691 
functioning (Williams & DeSteno, 2008). However, in-line with previous research (e.g., 692 
Rosin & Nelson, 1983) the results indicated no differences in task persistence or perceived 693 
mental effort between a rational and irrational approach to a competitive performance. 694 
Offering a nuanced view researchers have proposed irrational and rational beliefs may differ 695 
in the quality of motivation rather than the intensity. The core irrational belief of 696 
demandingness (e.g., should, must) has been compared to introjected regulation where actions 697 
are self-imposed in an attempt to avoid shame, guilt, and ego enhancement underpinned by 698 
the sense they “should” take part. Introjected regulation has been associated with expending 699 
greater effort, yet it is also related to higher anxiety, and reduced ability to cope with failure 700 
(Turner, 2016). The effects of irrational and/or rational beliefs on motivational quality may 701 
offer further insight into the precise effects on performance and warrants further 702 
investigation.  703 
Based on the findings we suggest for some irrational beliefs may be helpful towards 704 
performance. Nevertheless, considering the prevalence of mental health disorders in 705 
performance contexts such as elite sport (Hughes & Leavey, 2012) ethically practitioners 706 
would not encourage the adoption of irrational beliefs in the pursuit of performance 707 
excellence. In addition, no evidence exists to suggest irrational beliefs offer advantages above 708 
that of rational beliefs. Ultimately, we put forth a less polarized view as to the effects of 709 
irrational and rational beliefs on performance, acknowledging that for some thinking 710 
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irrationally may be advantageous in the pursuit of short-term goals, yet detrimental for ones’ 711 
psychological health in the long-term. REBT theory itself may offer an explanation into the 712 
paradoxical effects of irrational beliefs on psychological well-being and performance. 713 
Specifically, although rational beliefs are categorized as empirically true, logical, and 714 
pragmatic (i.e., helpful; Digiuseppe et al., 2013) REBT theorists have ignored the proposition 715 
that irrational beliefs can deny all logic and empirical arguments yet serve a helpful role 716 
towards goal achievement (Wilson, 2010). Furthermore, the view that irrational beliefs are 717 
wholly detrimental is challenged by the notion that human’s beliefs have developed with 718 
evolutionary design in response to their environment (Pelusi, 2003). Thus, serving adaptive 719 
functions for our ancestors, where the extreme, dogmatic, and drastic responses would have 720 
ensured favourable outcomes were met. Most recently, Turner (2016) has put forth the notion 721 
of ‘double-thinking’ that denotes irrational and rational beliefs can exist simultaneously in a 722 
transient and stable form. Originally proposed by George Orwell (Orwell, 1949), double 723 
thinking is based on the premise that humans are able to hold two contradictory beliefs in 724 
one’s mind simultaneously whilst accepting both of them. Thus an athlete maybe able to 725 
forget any fact or belief that has become inconvenient and to then only draw it back only 726 
when it is needed. For example, an endurance runner may harbour rational beliefs about 727 
adversity that ensure psychological health, yet during the final sections of a race irrational 728 
self-talk (e.g., “I must finish, otherwise it would be terrible”) may facilitate goal achievement.  729 
Limitations and Future Directions 730 
 It is important to understand the results in terms of its limitations, that if addressed 731 
could strengthen the study findings. In this study we examined the effects of irrational and 732 
rational self-statements rather than core beliefs. Further, while both self-report and objective 733 
measures of heart rate were used to confirm participant’s engagement with the study 734 
manipulations the content of self-statements were not tailored to irrational and rational beliefs 735 
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pertinent to the participants. To offer a more sensitive and accurate examination future 736 
researchers may wish to tailor core beliefs relevant to the participant, as well favour the use of 737 
objective measures  (i.e., pupil dilation as a measure of mental effort; G.Wood et al., 2016).  738 
The SGABS provided a reliable and validated measure of total general irrational belief 739 
scores. However, future researchers would be prudent to adopt a newly validated measure of 740 
irrational beliefs tailored for performance contexts, named the irrational Performance Beliefs 741 
Inventory (iPBI; Turner et al., 2016) to provide an accurate measure of performance specific 742 
beliefs. Rational beliefs and irrational beliefs are proposed to be dichotomous constructs, 743 
whereby low levels in one does not necessarily indicate high levels in the other (Bernard, 744 
1998). Thus, future researchers may wish to explore the interplay between irrational and 745 
rational beliefs, and the subsequent effects on performance. Research within REBT proposes 746 
a unitary model of emotion that are quantitatively distinct (i.e., high vs. low anxiety) and a 747 
binary model of emotion that are qualitatively distinct (i.e., anxiety vs. concern; Hyland & 748 
Boduszek, 2012). To this end, future researchers are recommended to establish a validated 749 
and reliable measure of emotion sensitive to measuring both the functionality and intensity. 750 
Finally, the precise mechanisms by which irrational and rational beliefs effect performance 751 
appear to be more complicated than previously hypothesised, therefore future researchers 752 
may wish to explore role of important psychological factors (e.g., self-efficacy) that may 753 
mediate the association between beliefs and performance. 754 
Conclusion 755 
The findings in the present study contrast with previous research indicating that the 756 
adoption of irrational self-statements did not lead to adverse effects on performance, 757 
performance efficiency, persistence, and psychological outcomes above that of rational self-758 
statements. To this end,3 we suggest irrational beliefs may have both positive and negative 759 
effects on performance, highlighting distinctions in both factual and practical rationality that 760 
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have been overlooked within the extant literature. The detrimental effects of irrational beliefs 761 
for psychological health are established, accordingly understanding the precise effects and 762 
mechanisms by irrational and rational beliefs effects ones ability to perform has valuable 763 
implications for practitioners utilising REBT within high performance contexts. 764 
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Figure Captions 936 
Figure 1. Diagrammatic representation of the data collection protocols for golf-putting task 937 
(Experiment 1), hazard perception task (Experiment 2 – phase one), and breath-holding task 938 
(Experiment 2 – phase two). 939 
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Table 1.  
Mean Scores (± SD) for Outcome Measures Collected in Experiment 1 and 2. 
 Baseline  Irrational Self-statement  Rational Self-statement 
Golf-Putting Task (Experiment 1) 
Golf Putting Performance 57.09 (21.03)  70.06 (17.15) 
1.62 (.47) 
1.59 (.72) 
 71.37 (18.39) 
1.50 (.36) 
1.51(.63) 
Pre-performance Anxiety 1.61 (.36)   
Concentration Disruption 1.52 (.66)   
Hazard Perception Task (Experiment 2) 
Hazard perception performance 30.03 (12.17)  26.63 (10.41) 
11.15 (27.05) 
370.83 (276.89) 
.80 (.67) 
1.26 (1.20) 
2.35 (4.39) 
 30.40 (10.48) 
19.68 (20.50) 
491.20 (369.09) 
.66 (.55) 
1.51 (.82) 
2.61 (2.49) 
Gaze data: Mean fixation duration on the hazard (ms) 10.79 (24.12)   
Gaze data: Time to fixate the hazard (ms) 375.22 (299.68)   
Pre-performance anxiety: Intensity .92 (.60)   
Pre-performance anxiety: Perceived helpfulness .91 (1.22)   
Physiological arousal (change scores; HR) 3.06 (5.69)   
Breath Holding Task (Experiment 2) 
Task persistence (seconds) 48.22 (15.40)  52.14 (16.55) 
102.09 (28.94) 
.91 (.67) 
.74 (1.54) 
4.96 (6.54) 
 51.67 (16.78) 
98.26 (21.46) 
.79 (.59) 
1.11 (1.08) 
4.53 (4.84) 
Perceived mental effort 96.11 (27.89)   
Pre-performance anxiety: Intensity 1.04 (.70)   
Pre-performance anxiety: Perceived helpfulness 1.00 (1.55)   
Physiological arousal (change scores; HR) 3.96 (7.90)   
Note * p < .05, **p <.001 
